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Introduction 
With the emergence of the first BSE case in Germany in November 2000, consumer 
confidence into the safety of meat products quickly eroded and led to a rapid restructuring of 
government agencies and policy instruments related to food safety.
1
 Similar to the 1996 
release of information in Germany about British BSE cases, the arrival of the first BSE cases 
in Germany in 2000 led to a highly intense and emotional reaction among German consumers 
(Loy and Steiner, 2004). This intense, though periodic, mass-level attention to BSE is an 
important attribute of contested governance (Ansell and Vogel, this volume) that has proven 
to be more distinct in Germany than in France or Britain (Besançon et al., Rothstein, this 
volume). In November 2000, the mass-level attention to BSE did not only lead to a reduction 
of beef-eating by more than half, but had repercussions for the entire food marketing chain, 
the animal breeding industry, the catering business and EU farm policy as a whole (Economist 
2001; Fox and Peterson 2004). Under political pressure, the federal minister of agriculture 
announced the establishment of a new ministry branch solely devoted to food safety, only one 
week after the first BSE case was reported.
2
 One month after the first BSE case, Chancellor 
Schröder announced that BSE had become one of his top priority issues („Chefsache‟). When 
the federal ministers of agriculture and health refused to consider further swift changes, 
Schröder forced them to resign in January 2001 and named a female lawyer from the Green 
party, Renate Künast, the new minister of agriculture. For the first time in German history, the 
minister of agriculture came from outside the sector. In addition to the changes in personnel, 
                                                 
1
 See Loy and Steiner (2004) for a review of the history of the BSE crisis in Germany and an exploration of 
price-setting behavior in the beef supply chain related to the 1996 BSE events. Fox and Peterson (2004) provide 
for more detailed scientific background on BSE and a chronology across Europe. 
2
 The Health Ministry was, up to then, fully responsible for handling food safety issues. 
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the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry was renamed as the Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture. 
 
In light of these changes, an important question is: to what extent do the observed institutional 
governance modifications reflect continued contested governance in terms of public distrust, 
when it challenges the legitimacy of institutional arrangements related to food safety (Ansell 
and Vogel, this volume).
3
 This chapter attempts to address this issue by exploring the scope 
and effectiveness of visual changes in governance in Germany, including the policy 
instruments that were implemented to address food safety issues and particularly the eroding 
trust in public authority. The key role of regaining trust into public authority in this process is 
echoed by policymakers themselves. Renate Künast identified this as her top priority, by 
emphasizing that “Trust through change must be our motto.” (Künast 2002). David Byrne, 
European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, has announced that “Clearly 
there is a need to develop trust. The food safety agencies, which have been established in 
many European countries, serve as good examples. These agencies create a credible and 
visible distance between different government structures with the broad aim of increasing 
transparency which, in turn, bolsters public acceptance and confidence.” (Byrne 2004). 
However, before exploring to what extent these calls for public trust and reduced contestation 
were more than cosmetic rhetoric, this chapter first considers some specifics of Germany as 
they relate to food safety and food markets in general. 
                                                 
3
 “Throughout his book, North [1981] … argues that good institutions will simultaneously support private 
contracts and provide checks against expropriation by the government or other politically powerful groups. 
There is a growing consensus among economists and political scientists that the broad outlines of North‟s story 
are correct: the social, economic, legal and political organization of a society, i.e., its “institutions”, are a primary 
determinant of economic activity.” Acemoglu and Johnson (2003: 4). 
  4 
 
Germany could be characterized by highly price-sensitive consumers. Discounters, for 
example, have gained a market share of close to 40 percent, which is higher than in any other 
European country (M+MPlanetRetail 2002).
4
 At the same time, only a small fraction of 
consumers are purchasing organic meat, which consumers perceive as being „safer‟ than 
conventional meat products.
5
  
 
Given Germany‟s traditional reliance on state intervention since the Bismarck Era, a shift 
towards more industry-led initiatives in the food sector seems, at first sight, to be more 
challenging and more appropriate than in other European countries. Industry-led initiatives, 
such as the 2001 voluntary national quality assurance scheme “Quality and Safety” („QS‟), 
can be highly desirable in a world of increasingly differentiated food produce. With 
increasing complexity in the food system, a greater reliance on market mechanisms that 
exploit the informational advantages of decentralized market participants has advantages over 
state intervention. This is because competitive forces can deliver efficient price discovery by 
exploiting local and idiosyncratic information (Hayek 1945) and by giving important 
incentives – for example through reputation – that are necessary for the functioning of quality 
assurance schemes.
6
 At the same time, increasing complexity calls for a stricter separation of 
tasks between markets and government and a stronger government focus on auditing 
mechanisms and liability law. 
                                                 
4
 In 2002, the sales of discounter Aldi alone grew by 16% (M+MEurodata 2003). 
5
 Organic share of total food production in 2000:  2.2% (Hamm, Gronefeld and Halpin 2002). 
6
 As we know from information economics, there is a role for government intervention, since Hayek‟s (1945) 
fundamental insight into market efficiency only holds when markets operate in the absence of imperfect 
information. A more refined argument would also need to take account of trade and industrial organization 
issues, such as the observed increasing concentration in the German food industry. These issues raise new 
concerns related to multi-level governance. Issues related to credence attributes will be discussed below. 
  5 
 
Indeed, we observe an increasing degree of government intervention along those dimensions 
when considering the food safety related regulations initiated by Mrs. Künast, or EU 
directives related to food safety.  To emphasize, such intervention can generally be justified, 
since it is well known that without intervention, a market failure exists in delivering the 
optimal level of safety at the margin. The underlying problem of inadequate or asymmetric 
information can not only be addressed through the regulation of liability, but also by public 
information provision, and through the mandatory implementation of minimum quality 
standards or guarantees.
7
  
 
The case for government intervention with regards to setting minimum product quality 
standards is a critical one in the context of this chapter.
8
 In a world of increasing proliferation 
of brands and private quality assurance systems, the problem of transparency and 
heterogeneity of product quality standards can often be addressed more efficiently through 
mandated quality standards, since certified quality standards reduce information cost to 
consumers about the safety level of quality attributes.  Importantly, product quality standards 
rather than process quality standards enable the industry to choose the most efficient method 
                                                 
7
 Evidence of this is found in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 which created the European Food Safety Authority 
and established traceability at all stages in the food marketing chain. 
8
 Both extrinsic quality attributes (e.g. „QS label‟) and intrinsic quality attributes (e.g. „organic‟) impact on the 
quality perception of consumers. Intrinsic quality dimensions include therefore process attributes that are not 
observable at the point of purchase and may thus lead to market failure (even from ex post observations the 
buyer can never be certain of the quality of the services he purchased (Emons 1997)). The literature (Nelson 
1970) has therefore differentiated credence attributes from experience attributes (whose utility is assessed after 
purchase by actual consumption) and search attributes (which can be determined by inspection without the need 
for consumption).   
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of achieving a given level of food safety.
9
 In sum, since markets can help to resolve failures 
related to food safety through competition and reputation, and since governments can take an 
important role with regards to liability and information provision, a balanced, accountable and 
transparent division of responsibilities poses the greatest challenge to a government trying to 
regain consumer confidence and assure an optimal degree of food safety at the margin.
10
 
 
The following chapter aims to focus on the newly emerging mix of market and government 
initiatives in Germany with regards to food safety, as exemplified by an industry led, 
voluntary national quality assurance scheme („QS‟) and the reform of governance structures at 
the federal level. Following a discussion of the changing scope of governance with regards to 
food safety, the chapter discusses the effectiveness and efficiency of the emerging reform 
elements of the new governance structures related to food safety. In doing so, this chapter 
tries to answer to what extent food-safety related governance in Germany remains contested. 
Finally, this chapter aims to provide an outlook on emerging tensions between governance 
modes, since these tensions are likely to determine the accountability, competence and 
efficiency of forthcoming food safety regulations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 In this sense, the European Commission has opted for efficiency: the White Paper on Food safety promotes 
food safety standards and emphasizes that food safety is related to the attributes of the products, not to a specific 
method of production. 
10
  Persson et al. (1997) make this call for accountability and transparency very clear in their analysis of political 
accountability: “Another relevant problem is how to increase the accountability and transparency of decisions in 
the European Union: witness the handling of the mad-cow disease by the European Commission.” (p.1199). 
  7 
The Changing Scope of Governance 
 
Given the federal structure and the institutions that are associated with a „social market 
economy‟ such as Germany, we expect that the underlying system of governance as related to 
food safety is distinctly different from other economies (Chandler 1990).
11
 However, before 
exploring several changes in Germany‟s governance structure related to food safety, it is 
essential to identify what is meant by scope of governance, governance structure and its role 
in shaping an incentive structure that underlies economic activity and political distress. 
 
Following North (1990), Nelson and Sampat (2001) and vonTunzelmann (2003), the scope of 
governance can be captured by three key elements: process, structure and control. In the 
context of this chapter, we consider governance processes as the changing roles and 
relationships of agents and agencies in the course of the BSE events in Germany.
12
 
Governance structure relates to the different forms through which decisions are made. 
Structures can thus induce and govern collective decision making. Finally, the capability of 
governance (competence) needs to be captured: control refers to the power to make economic 
and policy decisions through different structures.  
 
In identifying the key parameters of regulatory organizations in OECD countries, Scott (2003) 
suggests that there are at least three main combinations of form and power: organizations 
                                                 
11
 Scholars in other areas, for example finance, have argued that we can distinguish national systems of 
governance, as defined by their methods of decision making and the underlying balance of power (Albert 1993). 
Consider also that Presidential and Parliamentary democracies involve different incentive structures, 
informational asymmetries and thus scope for abuse of power (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997). 
12
 This is meant to include changes in information processes, such as changes in a newly regulated information 
exchange between local and federal ministries. 
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established and given power by statute; organizations established without direct state 
involvement, through contracts or incorporation, but empowered by state legislative 
instruments; and non-state organizations exercising private regulatory power (p.309).
13
 For 
example, consider the contrast between conventional modes of governance that rely on 
lengthy legislative processes, and more flexible governance modes such as those that rely 
more heavily on regulatory agencies or voluntary standards (e.g. „QS‟). Lengthy legislative 
processes are more vulnerable to political and lobbying distress due to their structure as 
compared to the more robust and flexible structure of regulatory agencies in a „social market 
economy‟, which are likely to undergo appropriate checks and balances.  They are, therefore, 
more likely to be accountable and democratically legitimate (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 
1997). This is perhaps where the economic view of scope of governance is echoed most 
closely in the political view of contested governance, in terms of its challenge to the 
legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements, and in terms of its sectoral or multi-sectoral 
scope (Ansell and Vogel, this volume). Consider that the „new institutional economics‟ 
literature refers to a governance structure as the institutional framework within which the 
integrity of a transaction is decided (Williamson 1979: 235). The elements of such an 
institutional framework, the institutions themselves, are the humanely devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction (North 1991: 97). According to North 
(1991), these institutions consist of the informal constraints (sanctions, customs) and formal 
rules (laws, property rights) that define part of the choice set of economic agents and thus 
determine the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity (p.97). These 
                                                 
13
 “Paradoxically the last of these is often the most independent and most powerful because of its capacity to 
combine each of the three regulatory functions of rule-making, monitoring and enforcement, without the 
involvement of any other organizations.” (Scott, 2003: 309). 
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informal constraints and formal rules lie at the heart of those conditions that either challenge 
or support the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements, and can therefore be directly 
associated with contested governance in the sense of Ansell and Vogel (this volume). 
 
Given a mix of formal and informal constraints, the power of making economic and policy 
decisions through the above structures often fails to deliver equity and efficiency. We can 
identify several forms of failures that can be made responsible here: market failure, 
government failure, corporate failure and network failure. There are two reasons why these 
different modes of failures should not be considered in isolation in the context of our analysis, 
First, we are interested in exploring changes in the scope of governance following the BSE 
outbreak in Germany, as they relate to the changing scope of contestation. Consider that the 
interrelationship between different modes of failure can directly be linked to the BSE 
outbreak as such. Government failure exacerbated market failure by relying on non-
transparent decision-making and thus hampering economic incentives. Due to inappropriate 
liability rules at the farm and processing level, as well as inadequate and asymmetric 
information in the provision of ruminant feedstuff, a market failure emerged. But inadequate 
liability at the level of public authorities and thus the failure to align incentives between 
agents in the political hierarchies were also, most likely, important reasons for the BSE 
outbreak. As a further example, consider the UK where the specified bovine offal ban failed 
for at least two reasons. First, it failed because of the non-compliance of industry-participants. 
Second, it failed because government officials who were in charge of designing and enforcing 
the ruminant feed ban did not act in the interest of society. Government officials decided to 
lower the temperature for treating animal protein in feedstuff processing, while their decision-
  10 
making process took place in the absence of public scrutiny.
14
 Therefore the conditions that 
led to the outbreak of BSE may be regarded as a prime example for contested governance: 
Ansell and Vogel (this volume) argue that contested governance is particularly likely where 
intense public scrutiny confronts an extensively institutionalized policy sector in which day-
to-day routine decisions are delegated to experts or administrators with little on-going 
attention or interest from the public.   
 
The second and related reason that supports an analysis of the interrelationship between the 
above modes of failure relates to the three „ideal‟ types of governance modes: markets, 
networks and hierarchies (Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell 1991).
15
 Importantly, 
two types of hierarchies can be distinguished here, the corporate hierarchy (large firms), and a 
country‟s political hierarchies.16 This division between governance modes is particularly 
relevant here, since this chapter argues that a transparent and sharp distinction between the 
roles of markets and political hierarchies is desirable in resolving contested governance with 
regards to food safety. The following sections explore these issues more explicitly, by 
analyzing the key dimensions of changes in the political hierarchies in Germany, and by 
examining changes in a market-led initiative, both of which aim to address contestation in 
food safety matters. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Fox and Peterson (2004) also emphasize the importance of cross-contamination of feed, in mills and on farms, 
which is difficult to detect because of lack of reliable tests. 
15
 “The key feature of networks … is the way cooperation and trust are formed and sustained within networks. In 
contrast to either hierarchy or market, networks coordinate through less formal, more egalitarian and cooperative 
means.” Thompson, et al. (1991: 18). 
16
 See Libecap (1992) for early evidence of the interrelationship between these hierarchies, as they were shaping 
the first federal food quality guarantees in the US (1887-1891). 
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A Voluntary National Quality Assurance Scheme: “Quality and Safety” (QS) 
 
The shift in incentives for the German food demand chain to implement a large scale quality 
assurance scheme after the BSE events is a further reflection of the shifting balance of 
regulation, away from publicly mandated food safety regulations, more towards industry-led 
initiatives.
17
 Several authors have explored general incentive and adoption issues of such 
quality assurance schemes at the industry level (Henson and Caswell 1999; Caswell, Bredahl 
and Hooker 1998).
18
 However, given the scope of this chapter, the following sections attempt 
to describe the functioning of the QS scheme, highlight its actual and potential weaknesses, 
and explore its broader relevance in the context of German food safety regulation and 
contested governance. 
 
The following discussion focuses on the new „QS‟ scheme, mainly for three reasons. First, in 
contrast to the limited coverage of other retailer-led schemes, the QS scheme reaches across 
the entire demand chain for meat, meat produce as well as fruit and vegetables.
19
 Second, it 
takes an interesting intermediate position in terms of incentive provision to the food demand 
chain, as it combines elements of a voluntary industry-led quality assurance scheme and a 
publicly mandated set of food safety regulations. Third, largely due to the composition of it 
members, the cautious criticism of Minister Künast (Die Zeit 2003; Agrar.de 2003), and a 
                                                 
17
 See Fearne, Hornibrook and Dedman (2001) for previous retailer-led beef quality assurance schemes in 
Germany. 
18
 Buzby, Frenzen and Rasco (2001) consider the adverse consequences on firms that may result from market 
forces (reputation, market share, revenue), food safety regulations (penalties) and product liability law (legal and 
compensation expenses). 
19
 A quality management system is in place in the dairy industry. The objective of the dairy industry is to align it 
with the QS system. 
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recent BSE-test scandal (Putz 2004) QS has become a focus of public debate that longs to be 
viewed through the lense of contested governance. 
 
In October 2001, representatives from the German farmers‟ federation, the federations of feed 
processors, meat processors and retailers joined together with the Central Marketing 
Association of German Agriculture („CMA‟), to form a limited liability corporation with the 
objective of establishing a national label and quality assurance scheme for conventionally 
produced meat and meat produce.
20
 Each of the federations has a veto right and sends two 
representatives to an „advising committee‟, whose task is twofold. First, it sets the control 
criteria according to which independent auditors are asked to classify and accredit system 
participants.
21
 Second, it defines and interprets the criteria according to which the assigned 
label is set up and communicated to the outside world.  
 
Two further institutions were established, the „sanctioning committee‟ and the „board of 
trustees‟. The sanctioning committee consists of three members, a lawyer, a judge and an 
expert sworn to impartiality. This committee rules over system participants that have not 
adhered to the control criteria, established by the advising committee. The sanctioning 
committee imposes penalties according to guidelines that are established by the advising 
committee. The other institution is the board of trustees, whose functions lie in public 
relations and advising the sanctioning committee.
22
 In order to reduce a centralized 
administrative burden, key demand chain members, such as cooperatives, packers and 
                                                 
20
 Most of the following factual information originates from the official website of QS: www.q-s.info/de 
21
 Auditors operate according to DIN 45011. 
22
 The board of trustees consists of twelve members. It is made up of academics, politicians, a union 
representative, a member from the German consumer association and a representative from the sugar industry. 
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slaughterhouses have become the „local administrative centers‟ for producers, who then 
become „associated producers‟.  
 
The structure of controls of system participants can be characterized in terms of three steps: 
the firm-level self-control, an independent auditing and a control of the auditing. Currently 
this control of the auditing is performed by the QS corporation itself, or by independent 
auditors that are chosen by QS. Independent auditing occurs randomly, but auditors have to 
announce their visit at least one week in advance. The auditors check on physical criteria such 
as hygiene and administrative criteria such as documentation. Some criteria are exclusion 
criteria, but after passing those, each farm obtains an index number. Depending on the 
percentage of criteria fulfilled, farms get classified as QS-standard-1, 2 or 3. There are several 
incentive problems with this system. First, it is not made public into which QS-standard a 
system participant (and thus his product) has been classified. Second, the auditing frequency 
differs according to specie (higher for beef than for pork) and level of system participant (key 
distinction between farmers and „local administrative centers‟). For example, a pork producer 
who has been classified into QS-standard 1 has three years before he can expect the next 
auditor on his farm (two years for QS-standard 2, and one year for QS-standard 3). Third, the 
auditing frequency and stringency is particularly low at the retail level. As soon as more than 
10 percent of retail outlets in a given chain have achieved a given QS-standard, this QS-
standard will automatically be granted to all the remaining outlets. Once a retail chain has 
been granted QS-standard 1, only 10 percent of its outlets will be randomly selected for 
auditing (15 percent annually for QS-standard 2 and 20 percent annually for QS-standard 3).   
 
  14 
Given the inexperience with this type of quality assurance scheme, it is of interest to examine 
the practical implications for the alliance members further. Beyond the mandatory federal 
requirements in terms of documentation of origin and medication, the use of antibiotics is 
more strictly regulated under QS. Growth antibiotics were permitted for the production of 
piglets and in the early fattening stages of pork production until January 2004. A total ban on 
growth antibiotics has since been implemented throughout the lifecycle of all animals. 
However, the use of GM feedstuff as well as the use of fully slatted floors in pork production 
is still permitted (Putz 2004). Another important implication for farmers is the compulsory 
monitoring of their salmonella status, exceeding the general mandatory federal regulations. 
The data about the salmonella status of an individual animal as well as a classification of the 
entire farm is fed into a central Salmonella data base. From there, farmers and 
slaughterhouses can access the data. Initially sow herds were exempt so the coverage of the 
Salmonella monitoring was incomplete until January 2004. 
 
To emphasize, there are no implications and specifications at the farmgate or any other level 
regarding GMO‟s or animal welfare criteria. As slaughterhouses, processors and retailers 
already have to comply with federal regulation regarding traceability, there is no additional 
impact from QS.  
 
Since the initiation of the QS system, the first certified produce appeared on the markets in 
September 2002, while the first meat under the new QS-label was sold by Walmart. Clearly, 
that was a message to all those who believed that QS would automatically guarantee higher 
retail and producer prices.  
  15 
 
However, for the first time in German history, a voluntary national quality assurance scheme 
was established. Since regulators are interested in the efficient provision of a desired level of 
food safety, this should be seen in a positive light as we need to consider economies of scale 
associated with safety-specific capital.
23
 With QS, as with other schemes of vertical 
integration, firms can obtain the necessary minimum efficient scale of production. 
Nevertheless, QS has only achieved a limited coverage of the entire sector with about 50 
percent of pork and 32 percent of beef produced under the QS label (October 2003). This is 
surprisingly low, given that QS originated as a result of safety problems in the beef sector. 
Beginning in early 2004 QS auditing had also started in the fruit and vegetable sector. 
Furthermore, system participants hope that QS will improve international competitiveness of 
QS certified fruits and vegetables, since QS audits will be embedded in the global system of 
EUREPGAP audits.
24
 
 
With the key objective of establishing a quality assurance scheme that covers the entire 
vertical supply chain based on HACCP principles, the QS scheme has achieved standards 
only slightly greater than Germany‟s mandatory standards: its criteria rest generally on 
existing mandatory standards and are only distinct in terms of a more extensive data 
management system (which is meant to improve traceability) and increased Salmonella 
                                                 
23
 This point deserves further emphasis since German meat production, particularly in pork, is characterized by 
much smaller production units as compared to other European partners. Given the lack of large, homogenous 
supplies, this is likely to lead to further competitive pressure, as German processors and retailers are likely to 
look beyond the German border as soon as others have adopted QS standards. 
24
 Key specifics of EUREPGAP are: transparency, recognition of existing schemes and programmes via 
Benchmarking and an easy to adopt Good Agricultural Practice protocol that is based on a master HACCP plan 
(no full HACCP excersise at the farm gate). 
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monitoring. Along those criteria, QS fulfills the EU Food Safety Law 178/2002 in terms of 
traceability and self control. 
 
In sum, what are the most critical points of the QS system? Given its limited coverage in 
terms of total production, it appears that the system‟s credibility remains limited as long as 
there is leeway for members of the supply chain to circumvent the system. More strikingly, 
the very reason for establishing the QS label does not appear to be taken seriously: according 
to „Foodwatch‟, an independently funded German organization for consumer's rights in the 
field of agricultural and food policy, nine German farms were identified where QS certified 
beef was not tested for BSE (Putz 2004). Furthermore, considering the institutional structure 
of the QS system, the role of the „sanctioning committee‟ appears questionable in two points. 
First, a potential conflict of interest emerges since the sanctioning committee imposes 
sanctions according to guidelines that were established by the advising committee. Second, 
and most importantly in the view of the declared objective of improving transparency, those 
system members that violated the QS criteria and were punished with sanctions are not made 
public. Further, the lack of transparency with regards to the system participants‟ classification 
into QS-standards, and the low auditing frequency deserve to be emphasized again. Also, the 
Salmonella monitoring scheme is insufficiently rigorous, as there are no bacteriological 
examinations of the animals required.
25
 Problems with establishing a more rigorous 
Salmonella monitoring scheme can only be anticipated from the fact that the German 
government had previously led a voluntary national eradication and disease control program, 
which was abandoned by the end of 1999 due to lack of participation. 
                                                 
25
 No judgement can be made regarding the actual status of infection; it is merely possible to judge whether an 
animal had contact with Salmonella in the past. 
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Some critical issues extend further to the butchers and the retailers. The butchers‟ association 
has refused to join the label, based on two points. First, butchers argue that the additional 
compliance costs will not be counterbalanced by a higher consumers‟ willingness to pay. 
Second, the butchers believe that their quality standards are already above QS standards. 
Results from a recent study (Loy and Steiner 2004) suggest that butchers have indeed been 
able to charge higher prices as compared to supermarkets.
26
 As several studies have 
confirmed, German consumers appear to value the „personal relationship‟ with a butcher more 
than placing their trust in an „anonymous label‟ (Nielsen 1998; Wirz 1996). The fact that 
butchers have not joined the QS system, although they currently account for about 40 percent 
of meat sales in Germany, could therefore be regarded as a further indication of the inability 
of the QS corporation to communicate the label‟s benefits to consumers, beyond those that are 
conveyed through the current mandatory standards.  
 
Further, consider the retail level. The QS scheme started as a retailer-led quality assurance 
scheme, with its first meat being sold through Walmart. Many producers and food processors 
were thus implicitly forced to adopt QS standards, or lose their outlets. Clearly, with an 
increasing concentration at the retail level, it is important to keep antitrust issues in mind. 
 
In total, and accounting for the now tightened standards as compared to the initialization 
stage, QS appears to have slightly lifted the overall level of food safety beyond the current 
mandatory state regulations. However, it appears striking that a quality assurance scheme was 
                                                 
26
 Also, in the wake of the 1996 BSE crisis in Germany, they appear to have been able to adopt a more consistent 
pricing strategy, as reflected in a lower price variability (Loy and Steiner 2004). 
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put into place with little rigor first, before more stringent measures were adopted. This may be 
rational with regards to minimizing system participants‟ initial compliance costs. But it is 
unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy with regards to regaining consumer confidence 
and market share. Consider that at present, the QS label appears to carry a low informational 
value, since it is difficult to communicate to consumers the differences between the QS label 
and the required standards objectively. Beyond the complexity of the underlying standards, a 
low consumer valuation is also anticipated due to a continuing lack of consumer trust. This is 
not only due to the fact that most of the information about QS originates from its system 
members, but also because German consumers continue to be surprised by undesirable 
substances in the food demand chain (May 2002: Nitrofen in organic wheat, July 2003: 
Dioxin in feedstuff).  
 
Nevertheless, due to its broader scope and larger scale than previous small-scale industry-led 
quality assurance schemes, the implicitly improved standard harmonization could, in 
principle, be seen in a positive light for consumers. Consumer choice could be improved due 
to the reduction in the complexity of labeling and standards information.  However, due to the 
greater comparability of standards, transparency is likely to lead to greater competitive 
pressure on other sector participants to differentiate themselves. A continuing proliferation of 
domestic and international retailer or producer led quality assurance schemes could be 
expected to appear on the German market in the future. Consumer gains could thus be with 
regards to price, but whether consumers gain in terms of information provision is likely to be 
  19 
determined by how industry players and the government find a balance between standards 
regulation and label proliferation.
27
 
 
Further, since QS system participants have developed the Salmonella monitoring system 
based on the European Parliament‟s regulation on the control of Salmonella, QS is likely to 
serve as basis for a faster and more efficient introduction of the expected mandatory 
regulation.
28
 In future, it should also guarantee a smoother compliance with the proposed 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (COM 2003/0174, 16.9.2003). 
Beyond the Salmonella criteria in QS, it is also the establishment of a central Salmonella data 
base that anticipates forthcoming EU regulation with regards to traceability, and should thus 
bee seen in a positive light.
29
 Given these potential harmonization benefits, it will be 
interesting to continue to observe the forthcoming governance interplay between political and 
corporate hierarchies, especially after the recent reform of federal ministries and regulations 
in Germany. 
 
The Reform of Food Safety Regulation in Germany 
 
The most visible change in governance that can be associated with food safety issues relates 
to the renaming of the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry to the Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture (BMVEL) in January 2001. This 
                                                 
27
 Consider also that the German government does not intend to replace QS by any national set of regulations 
(BMVEL 2003). 
28
 See directive 2001/0176 (COD) and 2001/0177 (COD), as in COM(2003) 434, 16.7.2003. 
29
 EU Food Safety Law 178/2002 has taken effect on the 1st January 2005. 
  20 
occurred only one day after the federal minister for health and the federal minister for 
agriculture were forced to resign. 
 
The following section outlines the changes in governance structure before attempting an 
assessment of these reforms. Throughout, this section will relate to a study of the German 
court of auditors, which was initiated by Chancellor Schröder at the end of 2000 („von Wedel 
report‟; von Wedel 2001). This 127 page report, which was published in July 2001, is 
particularly insightful for two reasons. First, its editor was the president of the German federal 
court of auditors and, at the same time, the federal commissioner for operating efficiency in 
public administration.
30
 Second, the report came about with the cooperation of experts of the 
court of auditors, the BMVEL, as well as an advising committee that consisted of 
representatives from farmers, consumers groups and science. 
 
The re-naming of the ministry into the BMVEL had an immediate structural consequence. 
The Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection (BgVV) was placed under the jurisdiction of 
the BMVEL and finally dissolved in November 2002. The BgVV‟s responsibilities were then 
taken over by three federal institutions: The BMVEL, the newly created federal institute of 
risk assessment (BfR) and the newly created federal office for consumer protection and food 
safety (BVL), both of which were created in November 2002. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, the BfR is responsible for risk analysis, risk communication to policy makers 
and the public, and cooperation with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
(Agrarbericht 2003). Risk management responsibilities (including the admission of pesticides) 
                                                 
30
 Since January 2002 Dr. von Wedel is member of the European court of auditors. 
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and the coordination of joint control functions between the Federation and the federal states 
were taken over by the BVL. The reform of these institutions has very much followed the 
blueprint of the von Wedel report.
31
 
 
The report‟s criticism focuses on three traits of the previous scope of governance. These are 
the fragmentation of food safety related responsibilities across Federal ministries, the lack of 
an independent scientific center advising the BMVEL, and the lack of coordination between 
the Federation, the federal states and the EU in matters of food safety. 
 
Fragmentation of responsibilities 
 
After the immediate reorganization of the BMVEL in January 2000 there were still food 
safety related tasks for which the BMU (Federal Ministry for the environment, nature 
conservation and nuclear safety), the BMWI  (Federal ministry for the economy and 
technology) and the BMG (Federal Ministry of Health) were responsible. The von Wedel 
report found that there were eighteen subordinate Federal institutes engaged in food safety 
matters. In order to address this fragmentation, lack of coordination and in response to the 
Chancellor‟s intention that food safety matters should be concentrated within the BMVEL, the 
report contained two main suggestions. First, food safety tasks should be bundled within the 
BMVEL after a reorganized working structure of its departments. Second, a complete reform 
of the central policy department within the BMVEL was proposed to account for future 
strategic issues such as policy planning, coordination in research, and coordination in EU 
                                                 
31
 Following the von Wedel report, a working group on the „reorganization of consumer health protection‟ was 
convened in the BMVEL and published its findings and proposals in December 2001 (BMVEL 2001). 
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matters. While the bundling of food safety responsibilities has taken shape in the current 
BMVEL, the second proposal of the von Wedel report has not yet been implemented. 
 
Establishment of an independent scientific center for risk analysis 
 
Within the structure of the previously established Federal ministries, there was no scope for 
interdisciplinary risk analysis related to food safety. Therefore the von Wedel report proposed 
the establishment of such a center with the following tasks: (1) collect, analyze and evaluate 
information on food risk (risk analysis and risk communication) in order to provide „objective 
and preventative policy advice‟, (2) serve as an intermediary between the BMVEL and 
national and international research institutes, (3) serve as representative vis a vis the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The report recommended that this center be part of the 
BMVEL (in budgetary terms, with an independent governing status), that it have the power to 
contract research projects out, and guaranteed independence through similar principles and 
measures that rule for the Deutsche Bundesbank. Given the unresolved budgetary issue and 
faced with the difficult task of overcoming principal-agent (incentive) problems that would 
underlie such an „associated center‟, it is not surprising that this part of the proposal has not 
been put into practice in its original form.  
 
The Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) in its current form considers itself as the 
scientific body of the Federal Republic of Germany in matters of food safety. It has the legal 
form of a self-governing public institution, which is meant to provide the necessary scientific 
independence. The BfR aims to prepare expert reports and opinions on questions of food 
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safety and consumer health protection on the basis of internationally recognized scientific 
assessment criteria (BfR 2003). With the help of risk analyses, the BfR aims to formulate 
action options for risk reduction. The tasks of the BfR include the provision of scientific 
advice to federal ministries concerned with food safety matters, and the publication of original 
research and risk assessments to the public, in a transparent and comprehensible manner.
32
 
Further, the BfR is engaged in scientific cooperation with other international institutions and 
organizations that are involved in consumer health protection and food safety. The BfR takes 
a role which more closely resembles that of AFSSA in France (see Besançon et al., this 
volume), since its role as a public body for risk assessment is strictly separated from risk 
management. This contrasts with the UK reforms, where risk assessment, management and 
communication functions are combined within the FSA (see Rothstein, this volume). 
 
Addressing the lack of coordination at the national and EU level 
 
In anticipation of the foundation of the EFSA, the von Wedel report focused on organizational 
weaknesses at the level of the Federation as well as on the division of responsibilities between 
federal states and the Federation. In the past, the Federation was only partly responsible with 
regards to food safety matters. The responsibility was limited to the creation of laws at the 
level of the federation, as well as to cooperating responsibilities with EU institutions. Given 
Germany‟s constitution, the central role of the federal states was and still is in the sphere of 
execution (monitoring food quality, feedstuff and the private veterinary sector). In order to 
fulfill the joint tasks of the Federation and the federal states in terms of risk management, risk 
                                                 
32
 “The assessment results will, in principle, be made publicly accessible whilst maintaining the confidentiality 
of protected data.” BfR (2003). 
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evaluation and risk communication, the von Wedel report suggested the creation of a more 
output-oriented „coordinating agency of the Federation‟ (KSB). Created in its governance 
structure as a mirror image to EU governance structures, this KSB has been established 
through the BVL (federal office for consumer protection and food safety). Its associated 
responsibilities lie in the establishment of a central internal data network for food safety 
issues and harmonization of control standards and crisis management, such that the KSB 
functions as intercept for the European Rapid Alert System. However, two very appropriate 
recommendations of the von Wedel report have not been followed so far - that the data 
collected through the KSB be made public and that the KSB be used as a mechanism for 
exploring the legal appropriateness of existing liability laws.
 33
 
 
Beyond the reform of the BMVEL and its related institutions, the Government has enacted 
several other initiatives. On August 6, 2002, a law for the „new organization of consumer 
health protection and food safety‟ was passed in the upper house of the federal government. 
This legislation establishes the BfR and the BVL and re-labels the pesticide regulation, the 
epidemic regulation and the feedstuff regulation to conform with the newly labeled BMVEL. 
In 2003, the government has also invested about $13 million Dollars to support the national 
research initiative on TSE (Transmissible spongiforme Enzephalopathien). In addition, the 
government has reformed liability laws by integrating consumer rights into the BGB (the 
German civil code), making it easier for consumers to sue individual firms, and for consumer 
groups to sue associations. 
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 „Im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Verbraucherschutz in Bonn ist zwar eine ganze Abteilung damit 
beschäftigt, herauszufinden, wann wo welches Tier erkrankte und womit es gefüttert wurde. Doch die Daten sind 
nicht öffentlich zugänglich.” (Die Zeit 2001). 
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Continued contestation or improved competence, accountability and legitimacy? 
 
The 2001 Agriculture Report of the BMVEL, published on February 14
th
, states that, 
 
“The BSE scandal marks the end of agricultural policy of the old 
type. In the future, consumer protection in these sensitive areas of 
agricultural and food policy will be given priority over economic 
interests.”34 
 
In an attempt to explore the issue of remaining contestation in the above context and in the 
sense of Ansell and Vogel (this volume), it appears necessary to ask which traits of the 
reformed scope of governance can be linked to continuing public distrust in authority that 
challenges the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements. This chapter suggests that the 
lack of the following governance traits as related to food safety can be used to reflect upon 
this issue: 
 
Competence
35
 
 
 the capacity to select and replace ill-founded food safety policy instruments 
 the capacity to design and implement well-founded food safety policy instruments 
(e.g. the capacity to judge whether risk is acceptable or not) 
                                                 
34
 “Der BSE-Skandal markiert das Ende der Landwirtschaftspolitik alten Typs. In Zukunft hat der 
Verbraucherschutz in diesen sensiblen Bereichen der Agrar- und Ernährungspolitik Vorrang vor wirtschaftlichen 
Interessen.” (Agrarbericht 2001). 
35
 Williamson (1998) differentiates governance structures in terms of their cost and competence. 
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Accountability 
 
 the aptness of institutions to respond to changing demands and insights from citizens 
(democratic accountability from within) 
 the readiness of governing institutions to respond to evolving scientific knowledge and 
feedback from other democratic institutions (external democratic accountability) 
 external and internal accountability require transparency: only when the operation of 
governance structures is transparent can a critical flow of information be returned 
from citizens and science to the institutions themselves 
 
A further issue that is not covered in the above view of competence and accountability, yet 
emerges in the context of Germany‟s federal system is the characterization of governance in 
terms of centralization vs. decentralization, and its effect on the competence of governance. It 
appears that the reduction in fragmentation of food safety related responsibilities through the 
establishment of the BMVEL in its current form has led to a more competent scope of 
governance. 
 
Further, with the established separation of risk management from risk analysis and risk 
communication through the BfR and BVL (which mirrors European governance structures as 
implemented in the EU Food Safety Law 178/2002), accountability has also been, in 
principal, improved.  
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Regarding transparency, this chapter has stressed the lack of it on several occasions above, 
including in the context of the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR). This may prove to 
be the greatest weakness in terms of improving the food industry‟s and government‟s 
accountability.  
 
In sum, it appears that contestation in food safety matters has been reduced today when 
judged in terms of competence and accountability. Initially, and following the decree of 
Chancellor Schröder for organizational reform in January 2001, a mere re-bundling of 
responsibilities has been observed, without effective reform efforts related to food safety 
issues.
36
 Largely due to the von Wedel report, which was initiated by the Chancellor himself, 
this temporary peak in politicization has subdued. However, only the emergence of critical 
safety situations will prove how accountable and competent the governance structure will 
remain.  
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 “Es unterblieb eine umfassende interne Reorganisation, mit der Anliegen des gesundheitlichen 
Verbraucherschutzes entsprechend ihrer politischen Bedeutung gebündelt worden wären.“ (von Wedel, 2001: 
27). 
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Effectiveness and efficiency in a changing scope of governance 
 
The following section attempts a brief assessment of effectiveness and allocative efficiency as 
it relates to the current scope of governance in food safety matters.  
 
Effectiveness 
In order to consider the effectiveness of the reformed institutions more explicitly, the 
following criteria are employed: 
 
(i) achievement of goals inherent in the implemented regulations and policies 
(ii)  appropriateness of regulatory burden in its context 
(iii) facilitation of verification and traceability  
(iv) strengthening of liability law 
 
(i) The von Wedel report has established the fragmentation of the old Ministry of Agriculture 
as one of the main deficiencies to be resolved. Since the goals of the report were, in this 
respect, put largely into practice, it appears that the current governance structure represents a 
major – though overdue – improvement. However, without knowledge of the time allocation 
of individual ministries and branches on food safety related aspects and the corresponding 
achievement of specific goals, it is difficult to provide further judgement. 
 
(ii) Given the bundling of responsibilities and the reduction in fragmentation, the regulatory 
burden through multiple and overlapping governance structures is likely to be reduced. The 
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establishment of the BfR is important for improving the effectiveness of food safety 
regulations through conducting and promoting research in general, and through the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in particular. Since it is currently unknown to what extent the BfR uses 
cost-benefit analyses in the regulatory process (no such information has been made public on 
their website until June 2005), only the observed promotion of research and the associated 
establishment of a data network hints to an improvement in terms of regulatory effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, the above caveat in terms of lacking data transparency looms large.  
 
(iii) The government‟s attempt to establish a voluntary Salmonella monitoring scheme that 
ensures traceability and facilitates verification has failed. Instead, traceability has been 
achieved through the QS‟s Salmonella monitoring and the central Salmonella data base. 
 
(iv) Finally, with regards to producers, consumers and consumer groups, liability rules have 
been improved.  
 
Efficiency 
 
Efficient governance mechanisms are those which align incentive problems between agents 
that frequently occur due to the separation of ownership and control (Williamson 1998). 
„Good governance‟ aims thus to align incentive problems in order to permit the realization of 
(mutual) gains between agents. There are several ways by which the achievement of such 
gains may be hampered. In the face of the previously discussed changes in scope of 
governance, this section will briefly focus on issues of authority, liability and risk.  
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Authority, decentralization and efficiency 
 
As Aghion and Tirole (1997) emphasize, a gain in terms of efficiency can be made by giving 
up some control, i.e. giving away real authority, although formal control remains top 
priority.
37
 Considering the stricter bundling of food safety related tasks at the Federal level, 
the improved communication between Federal ministries due to the reduction in overlap of 
responsibilities, together with a more transparent decentralized federal governance structure, 
it is likely that the current governance structure is more efficient than previous ones. 
 
Liability and the provision of information 
 
From an efficiency point of view, it is desirable to use food safety regulation and liability 
rules jointly in order to control for risk related to food safety hazards (Shavell 1984; Skogh 
1989; Antle 1995).
38
 Although an improved regulation of the provision of risk-related 
information helps to assure and preserve consumers‟ freedom of choice, informational failures 
need to be addressed through standards and liability.
39
  Since 2001 we observe tighter liability 
rules that should strengthen deterrence. Together with an improvement of risk assessment, 
communication and management that appears to have been made (through the establishment 
of the BfR and the BVL), it is likely that the balance between regulation and liability has been 
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 Aghion and Tirole (1997) focus on a moral hazard setting (agents can take actions that are unobserved to 
others) with costly monitoring, which appears most suited in the present context. 
38
 When it is inefficient to address market failures through tort liability, there is need for regulation. 
39
 Issues related to inadequate and asymmetric information (credence qualities) have been discussed above. 
Liability can be shared, in a hierarchy, or it can be shifted among agents, each of which has different efficiency 
implications. Sunding and Zilberman (1998) analyze the case of shifting liability among firms and consumers, 
when agents follow what are perceived to be reasonable actions that result in accidental injury.  
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improved.
40
 So far, considering information made public through the internet, it is not 
apparent that much risk-related research has been performed in relation to food safety matters. 
It appears that, in striving for more efficient risk regulation, the BfR should address important 
issues, such as: how do consumers respond to different communication efforts of the 
government, and how does consumers‟ capacity to use differently formatted information 
vary?
41
  
 
In sum, the reformed food safety regulation appears suited to improve efficiency through the 
emphasis on information provision, standards and transparency, as these help to safeguard 
consumers‟ freedom of choice.42 Since we observe some improvements in liability law and 
standards regulation, and would expect that fewer resources are needed to achieve the 
acclaimed risk-related goals in the newly reformed governance structure, efficiency gains 
should be observed. Nevertheless, the lack of deterrence due to the reduction in potential 
liability that comes with the limited publication of risk data is likely to hamper efficiency (it is 
also in this sense that QS is inefficient by not publishing firms that defected). 
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 With „tightened‟ liability it will be more feasible to sue with lower transaction costs. Further, the legal 
instruments will be more suited to provide deterrence, assuming that firms correctly anticipate the compensation 
which would be imposed by the legal rules (Viscusi, 1989a). An improvement of liability rules along those lines 
will, through the reduction of transaction costs, help to ensure that a level of food safety is provided that is 
socially optimal. Consider that lower transaction costs may also be achieved through the court system itself, due 
to clearer liability rulings. 
41
 Viscusi and Magat (1992) discuss the conditions under which different types of information provision 
instruments are effective. Just, Wolf, Wu and Zilberman (2002) extend existing models of value of information 
by incorporating consideration of individuals‟ varying capacity to use differently formatted information and 
variation in their information needs. 
42
 The current refusal of the QS system to make the Salmonella status public could also be seen in this light: if 
the Salmonella status is disclosed, consumers could overestimate the uncertain outcome of contracting 
Salmonellosis with a certain probability. The level of meat demand would thus be suboptimal. However, a 
transparent system means also that scientists and the media have a role in transmitting the information to 
consumers such that these market failures can be averted. 
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Risk standards, cost-benefit analysis and the issue of risk perception 
 
When risk standards (standards to protect health) are used for choosing between different food 
safety regulations, a major concern is that the costs of different policy options may not enter 
into the design of risk standards, and standard setting is likely to reflect evidence of risk 
biases and responsiveness to political factors (Viscusi and Hamilton 1999). This calls for the 
use of cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, since governance decisions at the federal level need 
to account for private efforts to ensure food safety (QS), cost-benefit analysis should be used 
to facilitate the identification of effective intervention points in the food demand chain, and 
the identification of efficient mixes of mandatory and voluntary quality management systems 
(Unnevehr and Roberts 1997; Caswell 1998).
43
 The general importance and pitfalls of cost-
benefit analysis for regulatory decision making are well established (Nichols 1991; Arrow, et 
al. 1996). But importantly with regards to food safety, standard cost-benefit has also been 
refined to take account of scientific uncertainty, in ways that balance the Precautionary 
Principle against the benefits of waiting to learn before taking action (Gollier 2001).
44
 This 
raises three issues related to the legitimacy of the BfR, the BVL and the governance reforms 
as such. First, since it is unknown, at this stage, to what extent the BfR makes use of cost-
benefit analyses, it is difficult to judge how efficient the operations of the BfR and BVL are 
along these lines (there are no publications that reveal its actual use, although the BfR 
proclaims that it is „developing concepts‟ for cost-benefit analysis). Second, from the 
published information it is not known to what extent the Precautionary Principle is actually 
                                                 
43 See Unnevehr and Roberts (1997) for a discussion of cost-benefit analysis in the context of microbial food 
safety.  
44
 The Precautionary Principle asserts that uncertainty should never be used as a reason for postponing risk-
prevention efforts (Gollier 2001). 
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integrated into cost-benefit research at the BfR. Third, even if this done, it is not evident what 
role the Precautionary Principle takes as part of the reformed food safety regulations. 
However, in providing reformed institutional arrangements that reduce distrust in public 
authority and thus reduce challenges to legitimacy, the specification of a clear and transparent 
role of the Precautionary Principle in a newly emerging scope of governance should be given 
a high priority. 
 
Given consumers‟ different capacity and thus efficiency of using various forms of 
information, it is to be expected that consumer heterogeneity will pose further challenges to 
the work of the BfR and the BVL.
45
 Since German consumers have proved to be more 
sensitive than other European consumers with regards to food safety scandals and the 
provision of food safety information, consumer heterogeneity and the resulting problem of 
efficient allocation of risks should be part of the BfR‟s research agenda. An interdisciplinary 
research effort appears particularly appropriate, just as the von Wedel report has suggested, 
since this is likely to help in analyses to adjust the subjective risk to the objective one.
46
 
Future research could control for these aspects by taking advantage of the strengths of choice 
experiments from surveys, combining it with market data (Louviere et al.1999; Louviere, 
Hensher and Swait 2000). 
 
In sum, risk research should not degenerate to a governance marketing effort that aims at 
reducing perceived risk associated with search, experience and credence attributes. Rather, a 
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 It is well known that it is important to account for the endogeneity of risk: consumers differ in their marginal 
productivity of self-protection (Ehrlich and Becker 1972; Shogren and Crocker 1999).  
46
 See Viscusi (1989b) for analyses that account explicitly for the relationship between consumers‟ perception of 
risk and actual risk. 
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multidisciplinary research effort on risk perception is important for an efficient design of 
governance structures and a regaining of institutional legitimacy, since knowledge of 
perceived risk helps to rationalize and de-politicize risk assessment and those governance 
options which both the BfR and BVL have on their agenda. In doing this, those interested in 
effectiveness and efficiency of the evolving scope of governance in Germany may wish to 
consider Viscusi‟s findings as their paradigm: 
 
As in the case of risk perception biases, the most disturbing aspect 
of these potential market failures is that the government policies 
intended to eliminate the shortcomings often appear to be driven 
by the same set of influences.” (Kip Viscusi, 1990: 261) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Six weeks after the first BSE case emerged in Germany the foundations were laid for a 
sweeping reform of governance structures related to food safety: within 48 hrs both the 
minister of health and the minister of agriculture were forced to resign, and a lawyer and 
member of the green party became head of the former Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry.  The ministry was simultaneously re-named the Federal Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture. This chapter has tried to explore an emerging mix of market 
and government initiatives in Germany with regards to food safety, as exemplified by an 
industry led, voluntary national quality assurance scheme (“Quality and Safety”, „QS‟) and 
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the reform of federal level governance structures involved in food safety issues. Since both 
mandatory regulations and markets, through reputation and competition, can serve to provide 
appropriate incentives and constraints with regards to food safety matters to actors in the food 
industry, the functioning and implications of QS were considered together with the reforms of 
governance structures at the ministerial level. 
 
Before the actual changes in the different aspects of governance were discussed, an attempt 
was made to explore the key elements of scope of governance, i.e. structure, control and 
process, together with the evolving mix of types of governance modes in a more general 
context. This permits a clearer assessment of governance elements that follows with regards 
to aspects of competence, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency. In turn, it enables us to 
explore the extent to which the changing scope of governance faces ongoing public distrust 
that challenges the legitimacy of those newly reformed institutional arrangements (Ansell and 
Vogel, this volume). 
 
Following a review of the QS scheme, it appears that the initiative has lifted the overall level 
of food safety only slightly above the one supplied by the current mandatory state regulations. 
This is largely due to an attempt to implement a more rigorous Salmonella monitoring system 
and the need to satisfy all members of the demand chain that participate in the QS system. A 
low informational value of the label is asserted, also since it is difficult to communicate to 
consumers the differences between the QS label and the generally required mandatory 
standards objectively. But beyond the complexity of the underlying standards, a low 
consumer valuation is also expected due to a continuing lack of consumer trust. Public distrust 
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has only recently received a boost due to allegations of failures in BSE testing (Putz 2004). 
However, given the broader scope and larger scale of the QS scheme compared to previous 
industry-led quality assurance schemes, the implicitly improved standard harmonization 
should, in principle, be seen in a positive light with regards to consumer information and 
consumer choice. Nevertheless, it appears that in practice, the standard harmonization has 
taken place at such a low level that those informational gains to consumers are outbalanced by 
the fact that the QS label masks shortcomings that are likely to be unanticipated by consumers 
(neither GM feedstuff nor animal welfare criteria are currently part of the QS certification; the 
auditing procedures are not stringent enough to be effective). As a result, diminishing 
consumer trust may spill over to other existing or forthcoming labeling schemes. 
 
However, since QS system participants have developed a Salmonella monitoring system 
based on the European Parliament‟s regulation on the control of salmonella, QS could serve 
as basis for a faster and more efficient introduction of the forthcoming mandatory regulation 
at the EU level. In future, the QS scheme should also guarantee a smoother compliance with 
the proposed European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). But beyond the 
Salmonella criteria in QS, it is also the establishment of a central data base and thus 
traceability which is anticipating forthcoming EU regulation.  
 
In sum, the introduction of QS appears to have brought little, if any, immediate consumer 
gains in terms of improving consumer choice and information, yet its pioneering character 
and large scope across the food demand system appears to have brought some gains with 
regards to the implementation of future institutional and regulatory changes. Since the 
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German government must ultimately defend itself in terms of traceability measures and 
Salmonella monitoring vis a vis the EU, these regulatory gains from QS may in future help to 
reduce contested governance in the interplay between market-led and government-led food 
safety initiatives. 
 
The chapter goes on to explore governance changes with regards to the restructuring of 
German Federal ministries and the government‟s initiatives with regards to liability issues and 
information provision. Along with the criticism and reform proposals of a report of the 
German court of auditors, the chapter considers three aspects of the scope of governance 
before 2000, which are all relevant to exploring the extent of distrust in public authority and 
the legitimacy of the underlying institutional arrangements. First, the fragmentation of food 
safety related responsibilities across Federal ministries, second, the lack of scientific advice 
and research that links more directly with the Ministry of agriculture, and third, the lack of 
coordination between the Federation, the federal states and the EU in matters of food safety. 
Accounting for the most recent governance changes, it appears that the governance in food 
safety matters is less contested in the sense of Ansell and Vogel (this volume), and as judged 
in terms of competence and accountability. Given the bundling of responsibilities and the 
reduction in fragmentation that has taken place, the regulatory burden is also likely to be 
reduced.  
 
With the establishment of the federal institute of risk assessment (BfR) and the federal office 
for consumer protection and food safety (BVL) in November 2002, a credible attempt is made 
to separate risk analysis and risk communication from risk management. This approach is 
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similar to the developments in France with the introduction of AFFSA (see Besançon et al., 
this volume), but differs sharply from the UK approach, in which risk assessment, 
management and communication are combined within the FSA (see Rothstein, this volume). 
The creation of the BfR is important for improving the effectiveness of food safety 
regulations through conducting original research and promoting research in general, and 
through the use of cost-benefit analysis in particular. Since it is currently unknown to what 
extent the BfR uses cost-benefit analyses in the regulatory process, only the promotion of 
research and the associated establishment of a data network suggests that regulatory 
effectiveness is likely to be improved. Also, liability rules have been improved for producers, 
consumers and consumer groups. Nevertheless, lacking transparency with regards to data 
access to the outside world remains a problem. 
 
Finally, this chapter attempts to make a brief efficiency assessment of the emerging 
governance structures. Considering a more focused and decentralized division of authority 
together with tighter liability rules that should strengthen deterrence, the governance reform 
promises efficiency gains. Together with an improvement of tasks related to risk analysis, 
communication and management, it is likely that the balance between regulation and liability 
has been improved. Further, the reformed food safety regulations appear suited to improve 
efficiency through the emphasis on information provision, standards and traceability, as these 
help to safeguard consumers‟ freedom of choice. Nevertheless, the lack in deterrence due to 
the reduction in potential liability that comes with the limited publication of risk data is likely 
to hamper efficiency.  
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Also, the recent and repeated defeat of the government‟s „information law‟ for consumers at 
the upper house of parliament must be seen as a setback for restoring trust in public authority. 
Further, extensive consumer consultation, as it is practiced in the UK through a dedicated 
consumer consultive committee (see Rothstein, this volume) is also largely missing in 
practice, although the BfR proclaims risk communication as an interactive process and dialog. 
These two conditions are all the more important with regards to continuing contested 
governance, since effective risk communication is essential for building credibility, trust in 
public authority and thus enhancing the legitimacy of institutional arrangements.  
 
In view of the danger that the costs of different policy options may not enter into the design of 
risk standards, and that standard setting is likely to reflect evidence of risk biases and 
responsiveness to political factors, this chapter suggests that cost-benefit analysis should be 
implemented at various stages in the planning and decision making process of German food 
safety regulations. It is currently not evident whether or to what extent the BfR is making use 
of these tools. Further, a multidisciplinary research effort on risk perception, which should be 
linked to the BfR, is important and should be initialized in order to account for critical issues 
related to consumers‟ risk perception. To initialize such an effort appears important for an 
efficient design of governance structures, since knowledge of perceived risk helps to 
rationalize and de-politicize risk assessment and those governance options which both the 
BfR and BVL have on their agenda. 
 
A final comment is in order with regards to the internal accountability and thus legitimacy of 
German governance structures related to food safety. Following the BSE crisis in Germany, it 
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was a report by the German court of auditors which came about with the cooperation of 
consumer groups, farmers and Ministry officials that proposed sweeping changes in the scope 
of governance. Many of these changes, as they were discussed above, have been 
implemented, anticipating forthcoming developments at the EU and international level 
(Codex Alimentarius). In this sense, it appears that Germany‟s federal system has – despite or 
because of – its reliance on consensus-building been successful in improving the legality, 
effectiveness and contestation of food safety regulations.  
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